Missile warnings, undersea surveillance, and the new scramble at the top of the world.

Greenland is back on the strategic map because it sits at the crossroads of the Arctic’s new contest for access and awareness. As Russia hardens its military footprint in the high north and China plays the long game through investment and influence, the U.S. is treating Greenland less like a remote island and more like a strategic platform for missile warnings, undersea detection, and access across the North Atlantic.

Why Greenland matters

Greenland sits in the strategic “top-middle” of the globe: it is the Arctic landmass that helps determine what the U.S. can see, detect, and defend as great-power competition shifts north. Think of Greenland as a three-function chess piece:

(1) Missile warning / homeland defense: the shortest ballistic routes between Russia/China and the U.S. arc over the Arctic, making Greenland a prime location for early warning sensors; this is why the U.S. operates the Upgraded Early Warning Radar at Pituffik Space Base, supporting missile warning and missile defense missions.

(2) Undersea + North Atlantic access: Greenland anchors the seam between the Arctic and the North Atlantic–connected to the classic GIUK Gap (Greenland-Iceland-UK), a longstanding chokepoint used to monitor and constrain submarine movement into the Atlantic.

(3) Resources and infrastructure leverage: Greenland is also a critical minerals and enabling-infrastructure story–rare earths and technology metals increasingly shape geopolitical influence, investment, and supply-chain security.

What has changed 

For most of the post–Cold War era, the Arctic sat on the margins of U.S. strategy –remote, expensive, and comparatively stable compared to other regions. That era is over. The region is becoming more accessible, more militarized, and more strategically “contested,” with Greenland suddenly looking less like a frozen outpost and more like a key point in great-power competition.

  • Ice is changing access: As sea ice declines, routes that were once largely impassable are opening more often –boosting transit, resource interest, and competition.
  • Russia rebuilt Arctic hard power: Since the mid-2000s, Russia has reopened Soviet-era bases, expanded Arctic infrastructure, and treated the high north as a strategic military theater again.
  • China entered as a strategic investor: China calls itself a “near-Arctic state” and promotes a Polar Silk Road, using research and investment to build long-term Arctic leverage.

Together, these shifts have pulled three actors into sharper focus—Russia, China, and the United States/NATO:

Russia

  • Is rebuilding and expanding its Arctic military footprint –bases, airfields, radars, and strike capabilities—after the post-Cold War drawdown.
  • Treats the High North as core to nuclear deterrence, centered on the Northern Fleet and “bastion defense” logic.
  • Uses Arctic position to complicate NATO reinforcement routes and increase pressure in the North Atlantic.

China

  • Claims “near-Arctic state” status and promotes a Polar Silk Road to normalize its role in Arctic governance and trade.
  • Uses research missions, scientific stations, and commercial presence as strategic positioning –not overt military force.
  • Targets minerals and enables infrastructure (ports, telecom, transport) to build long-term leverage and supply-chain advantage.

United States/NATO

  • Treats Greenland as a critical platform for missile warnings and space domain awareness via Pituffik Space Base.
  • Refocuses on Arctic readiness and “domain awareness” as strategic competition expands north.
  • Aims to deter pressure on North Atlantic access routes, including the Greenland-adjacent seam to the GIUK Gap.

What is happening around Greenland and why it matters

Greenland is moving from the edge of the map to the center of the conversation as the Arctic becomes more active and strategically relevant. The shift isn’t one dramatic event –it’s a steady accumulation of military attention, better surveillance, and higher political stakes around Arctic security and development. In short: this is what the Greenland-centered Arctic competition looks like on the ground right now.

What’s happening:

  • More presence, more practice: Arctic exercises and operational planning are ramping up as NATO and regional states adapt to a sharper security environment in the High North.
  • More eyes on the region: The U.S. and allies are tightening Arctic “domain awareness”—tracking ships, aircraft, and missile threats more closely as early warning becomes more important.
  • More politics attached: Greenland’s infrastructure choices, foreign investment rules, and development plans increasingly come with a security dimension—because the economic decisions can have strategic consequences.

Why it matters

As activity rises in the High North, the Arctic becomes a place where small incidents can carry big consequences. More intercepts, exercises, and submarine operations mean more opportunities for accidents –or for routine moves to be misread as escalation, even when nobody intends it. At the same time, the competition isn’t just the military. Infrastructure is influential: ports, telecom networks, transport links, and mining projects can create durable leverage over time –especially in smaller economies where a few major deals can shape national priorities. And the Arctic is uniquely hard to monitor: distances are vast, communications are fragile, and surveillance gaps are real –so in a crisis, blind spots, especially around undersea infrastructure, can shape outcomes fast.

The Greenland story is not about a single crisis. It is about strategic gravity shifting north. As Arctic access expands and competition hardens, Greenland’s value grows as a platform for early warning, surveillance, and North Atlantic access, while its economic future, especially infrastructure and minerals, becomes increasingly tied to geopolitical choices. The key question for the next phase is whether the Arctic remains a zone of managed rivalry, or whether rising activity, investment competition, and operational friction turn Greenland into a more direct pressure point in the U.S.–Russia–China contest.